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Abstract
Adversarial examples are inputs to a machine learning system intentionally crafted by an
attacker to fool the model into producing an incorrect output. These examples have achieved a
great deal of success in several domains such as image recognition, speech recognition and spam
detection. In this paper, we study the nature of the adversarial problem in Network Intrusion
Detection Systems (NIDS). We focus on the attack perspective, which includes techniques to
generate adversarial examples capable of evading a variety of machine learning models. More
specifically, we explore the use of evolutionary computation (particle swarm optimization and
genetic algorithm) and deep learning (generative adversarial networks) as tools for adversarial
example generation. To assess the performance of these algorithms in evading a NIDS, we
apply them to two publicly available data sets, namely the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15, and
we contrast them to a baseline perturbation method: Monte Carlo simulation. The results
show that our adversarial example generation techniques cause high misclassification rates in
eleven different machine learning models, along with a voting classifier. Our work highlights
the vulnerability of machine learning based NIDS in the face of adversarial perturbation.
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1 Introduction
It is becoming evident each and every day that machine learning algorithms are achieving
impressive results in domains in which it is hard to specify a set of rules for their procedures.
Examples of this phenomenon include industries like finance [49, 5], transportation [37], educa-
tion [42, 22], health care [23] and tasks like image recognition [41, 16, 17], machine translation
[43, 7], and speech recognition [46, 24, 53, 50].
Motivated by the ease of adoption and the increased availability of affordable computational
power (especially cloud computing services), machine learning algorithms are being explored
in almost every commercial application and are offering great promise for the future of au-
tomation. Facing such a vast adoption across multiple disciplines, some of their weaknesses
are exposed and sometimes exploited by malicious actors. For example, a common challenge
to these algorithms is “generalization” or “robustness”, which is the ability of the algorithm to
maintain performance whenever dealing with data coming from a different distribution with
which it was trained.
For a long period of time, the sole focus of machine learning researchers was improving
the performance of machine learning systems (true positive rate, accuracy, etc.). Nowadays,
the robustness of these systems can no longer be ignored; many of them have been shown
to be highly vulnerable to intentional adversarial attacks. This fact renders them inadequate
for real-world applications, especially mission-critical ones. Adversarial machine learning is
classified by that National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) into four categories
of attacks: evasion, extraction, poisoning, and inference. In this work, we examine adversarial
examples, which is a type of evasion attacks.
An adversarial example is an input to a machine learning model that an attacker has
intentionally designed to cause the model to make a mistake. In general, the attacker may
have no access to the architecture of the machine learning system being attacked, which is
known as a black-box attack. Attackers can approximate a white-box attack by using the
notion of “transferability”, which means that an input designed to confuse a certain machine
learning model is able to trigger a similar behavior within a different model. In this work, we
model a white-box attack by evaluating our examples against a variety of machine learning
models, thus showing performance over a wide range of possible systems.
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) monitor network traffic to detect abnormal
activities, such as attacks against hosts or servers. Machine learning algorithms offer the benefit
of detecting novel differences in network traffic through training on normal and attack traffic.
The traditional approach to designing a NIDS relies on an expert human analyst codifying rules
that define normal behavior and intrusions. Due to the frequent failures of this approach to
detect novel intrusions and the desire to lower the analyst’s workload, machine learning models
are incorporated into NIDS with the goal of automating the process and supplementing the
human effort.
On the other hand, the adoption of machine learning algorithms in the network intrusion
detection setting has raised a major security issue, namely the introduction of adversarial
machine learning. In this work, we study adversarial machine learning through the lens of
NIDS to show the sensitivity of machine learning models when faced with adversarial attacks
generated by perturbation techniques based upon evolutionary computation, deep learning,
and Monte Carlo methods.
In precise terms, we use three different perturbation methods to generate adversarial exam-
ples: particle swarm optimization (PSO), a genetic algorithm (GA), and a generative adver-
sarial network (GAN). We apply these algorithms to two well-known data sets, NSL-KDD and
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UNSW-NB15, and show that the perturbations created by these techniques are able to fool
eleven different machine learning models, plus an ensemble model. For our baseline adversarial
example generation method, we use a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation for random generation of
perturbations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the field of machine
learning. We set the notation and establish the state of the art taxonomy therein. In Section
3, we review the most relevant and up to date literature that deals with adversarial machine
learning. Section 4 describes the methodology used to generate adversarial examples. We
explain the intuition as well as the technical details of our chosen perturbation methods. In
Section 5, we apply our evolutionary computation and deep learning methods to the two data
sets mentioned above, and we record the results while contrasting them with the baseline per-
turbation method. We also discuss our findings and distinguish between the machine learning
models that are highly sensitive and the ones that show some type of robustness. We conclude
our work in Section 6 and pose some open questions and future research directions.
2 Prerequisites
Machine learning encompasses a vast field of techniques that extract patterns from data, as
well as the theory and analysis relating to these algorithms. A computer program is said to
learn from experience E with respect to some class of tasks T and performance measure P , if
its performance at tasks in T , as measured by P , improves with experience E [28].
In this section, we review the basic concepts of machine learning, broadly divided into three
major areas: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. We then
introduce the notion of adversarial machine learning and categorize the types of attacks along
three dimensions: timing, information, and goals. We adopt a simplistic approach for the sake
of exposition, the reader interested in the technical definitions and details is referred to the
books [21, 47, 28].
2.1 Supervised Learning
Consider a data set D = {(xi, yi) : i = 1, . . . , n} which lies in a product space Z = X × Y ,
where × denotes the cartesian product. We call X the input space or feature space and Y
the label space or the output space. In general, D is assumed to be drawn from an unknown
distribution.
For a model class F of functions mapping the input space X to the output space Y , the
ultimate goal is to find a model f ∈ F which is a good approximation of the labels actually
observed in the data. Given a labeled training data set D and a cost function l, the process
goes as follows: the cost function assigns a numerical value to each combination of data point,
true label, and classifier label. The classifier then tries to “learn” the function that minimizes
the cost incurred in predicting the label yi of a new data point (xi, yi) when only the predictor
variable xi is revealed to the classifier.
In simple terms, if there is some “true function h we are trying to learn, the goal is to find a
function f ∈ F which is as “close” to h as possible, given the constraints that the model class
imposes on us. When the labels are real numbers (Y = R), the paradigm is called regression
learning, and when Y is a finite set of labels it is called classification learning.
In regression learning, since the label values are real numbers, a loss function is used to
penalize predictions that are made far from the observed labels. An appropriate set of functions
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is the set of lp-norms defined as:
||f(x)− y||p :=
( n∑
i=1
|f(xi)− yi|p
) 1
p
, (1)
where x ∈ X is the input value, y ∈ Y is the true label and f(x) is the value predicted by
the model f . The most commonly used norms are the l1-norm and the l2-norm, also known
as the Manhattan norm and the Euclidean norm, respectively. A well-known example here is
linear regression, in which the model class F is the set of all linear functions and the standard
method is the least squares method that minimizes the l2-norm.
In classification learning, the labels form a finite set of values. For our purposes, we consider
a binary set of labels Y = {0, 1} where “0” indicates a benign network traffic and “1” indicates
a malicious network traffic. The most natural loss function in this setting is a function that
takes the value “1” if the predicted label matches the real label and “0” otherwise. Due to
its non-convexity, this function is sometimes replaced by the hinge loss function or the logistic
loss function.
2.2 Unsupervised Learning
In unsupervised learning, a typical data set consists only of features without labels, that is,
D = {(xi) : i = 1, . . . , n}. Hence, problems in this paradigm are concerned with identifying
aspects of the joint distribution of observed features rather than predicting a target label.
Common techniques include clustering, principal component analysis (PCA), and matrix com-
pletion.
In clustering, the data set D is partitioned into a collection S of subsets such that each
subset of S contains feature vectors that are close to each other based on a chosen metric or
distance. Examples of clustering are the k-means clustering and the Gaussian mixture model.
Challenges with this method is determining the numbers of clusters and which clusters are
indicative of malicious behavior.
In principal component analysis, the feature vectors xi of the data set D form the rows
of a matrix A of dimension say m. The task becomes to find a collection of orthonormal
basis vectors of A of size k < m. These vectors are the eigenvectors of the matrix A and
they correspond to the columns of a basis matrix B. Then any feature vector xi can be
reconstructed as x′i = V V
Txi, where T denotes the transpose of a matrix. The error can be
calculated:
Errori = xi − x′i = (I − V V T )xi, (2)
where I is the m × m identity matrix, and the goal is eventually to minimize such error in
order to get a good approximation of the original data.
In matrix completion, the general goal is to recover a complete matrix from a few given
observations. It is usually impossible to complete an arbitrary matrix with only partial obser-
vations, so additional assumptions are needed to proceed. A crucial assumption for example
is that the matrix has rank much smaller than the number of its rows and columns. In this
context, the Frobenius norm is the most commonly used norm to minimize the error incurred
by the matrix completion method.
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2.3 Reinforcement Learning
In reinforcement learning, the goal is to learn via interaction and feedback, or in other words
learning to solve a task by trial-and-error. The mathematical foundation for reinforcement
learning is based on Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), which we define below.
A discrete-time MDP is a tuple (S,A, T, r, δ) where S is a finite set of states, A is a finite
set of actions, T is the set of transition probabilities, r is a reward function, and δ ∈ (0, 1)
is a discount factor. Loosely speaking, reinforcement learning aims at maximizing the reward
function for a state s ∈ S and an action a ∈ A. Two techniques are widely used in this
framework: Q-learning and policy learning.
In Q-learning, a function Q is defined that takes as input one state and one action and
returns the expected reward of that action and all subsequent actions at that state. Before
learning begins, Q is initialized to a random fixed value and it gets updated as the learning
proceeds until it converges to an optimal value.
In policy learning, a mapping pi : S → A is introduced from the set of states to the set of
actions. We refer to this map as policy: a = pi(s) means that when state s is observed, the
best thing to do is to take action a. The task then becomes to find a policy with maximum
expected return.
2.4 Adversarial Machine Learning
Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) is a research field that lies at the intersection of machine
learning and computer security. Here, we present a general categorization of attacks in the
context of machine learning. Below we classify possible attacks into three main pillars.
First, the timing of the attack plays a crucial role in the process. The main distinction
occurs between evasion attacks and poisoning attacks. The former ones are executed at decision
time: they assume that the model has already been trained, so the attacker aims at changing
its behavior to cause the model to make incorrect predictions. The latter ones, in contrast,
take place before the model is trained. They aim at modifying a part of the data used for
training purposes to corrupt the final model.
Second, we highlight the nature of information the attacker has about the learning algo-
rithm. This allows us to compare white-box attacks and black-box attacks. Namely, white-box
attacks assume that the model is known to the adversary, whereas in black-box attacks the
adversary has limited or no information about the model, although may obtain some of the
information indirectly, for example, through queries and captured responses.
Third, attackers may have different reasons for attacking, such as evading detection or
reducing confidence in the algorithm. We differentiate between two broad classes of attack
goals: targeted attacks and reliability attacks. In a targeted attack, the attackers goal is to
cause a misclassification into a specific label or target. In contrast, a reliability attack aims
to degrade the perceived reliability of the machine learning system by maximizing prediction
error without any particular target label.
3 Related Work
The first publication that hints at adversarial machine learning dates back to the early 2000’s.
In 2004, Dalvi et al. [9] managed to fool classifiers for spam detection by adding intentional
changes to the body of an email. In 2005, Lowd and Meek [27] introduced the adversarial clas-
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sifier reverse engineering (ACRE) learning problem, the task of learning sufficient information
about a classifier to construct adversarial attacks. They presented efficient algorithms for re-
verse engineering linear classifiers with either continuous or Boolean features and demonstrated
their effectiveness using real data from the domain of spam filtering.
A taxonomy for attacks and defenses in adversarial setting was first established by Barreno
et al. in [3] and later refined in [4]. This taxonomy clearly defines threat models and includes
the concept of adversarial examples without any mentioning of the term. The first time this
term was coined was in 2013 when Szegedy et al. [44] investigated properties of deep neural
networks and found that by applying a certain imperceptible perturbation to an image, these
networks misclassified it with high confidence. Moreover, they showed that the specific nature
of these perturbations is not a random artifact of learning: the same perturbation can cause
a different network, that was trained on a different subset of the data set, to misclassify the
same input.
The last decade has witnessed a large body of publications in the realm of adversarial
machine learning in several domains and it is impossible to summarize it all in a paragraph
or two. We point the curious reader to a couple of excellent recent articles that attempt to
survey the field of AML. Liu et al. [26] investigate security threats and give a systematic
survey on them from two aspects, the training phase and the testing/inferring phase. They
also categorize existing defensive techniques of machine learning into four groups: security
assessment mechanisms, countermeasures in the training phase, those in the testing or inferring
phase, data security, and privacy. Further, Akhtar and Mian [1] focus on adversarial attacks
on deep learning in computer vision. They emphasize that adversarial attacks are possible
in practical conditions and review the contributions that evaluate such attacks in real-world
scenarios.
A more detailed survey is provided by Serban et al. in [38]. The authors introduce an
exhaustive list of attacks/defenses and thoroughly discuss the property of transferability. They
provide a taxonomy of attacks and defenses that is specific to the adversarial examples field.
This taxonomy is meant to properly structure the methods in AML and help future researchers
to position their work in comparison to other publications.
Most of the adversarial machine learning research so far has focused on unconstrained
domains (e.g., image and object recognition). This is mainly due to the following assumption:
the adversary is always able to fully exploit each feature or pixel of a given image. Several
attack algorithms currently exist in the literature and many variations to their models are
widely implemented. These models include the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13], the
Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) [35], Deepfool [29], and the Carlini Wagner attack
(CW) [6].
Goodfellow et al. [13] proposed the FGSM to generate adversarial perturbations based on
the gradient of the loss function relative to the input image and, thus, enable computational
efficiency through backpropagation. Papernot et al. [35] created adversarial saliency maps by
computing forward derivatives, which are used to identify the input feature to be perturbed
towards the target class. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [29] proposed an approach to find the closest
distance from original input to the decision boundary of adversarial examples. Carlini and
Wagner [6] introduced three new gradient-based attack algorithms (l2, l∞, and l0) that are
more effective than all previously known methods in terms of the adversarial success rates
achieved with minimal perturbation amounts.
Unlike unconstrained domains, the situation is quite different in constrained ones due to
the following three characteristics:
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1. The values within a single feature can be binary, continuous or categorical.
2. The values of different features in a data set can be correlated with one another.
3. Some features are fixed and cannot be controlled by a potential adversary.
For these reasons, it was not clear whether constrained domains are less vulnerable to ad-
versarial example generation than unconstrained domains. In [40], Sheatsley tested the above
hypothesis by creating targeted universal perturbation vectors that encode feature saliency
within the envelope of domain constraints. The experiment was able to generate misclas-
sification rates greater than 95% by introducing two algorithms: the adaptive JSMA, which
crafts adversarial examples that obey domain constraints, and the histogram sketch generation,
which produces adversarial sketches.
In this work, we aim to provide more evidence to the same hypothesis. We adapt the
algorithms used in GA, PSO, and GAN to generate adversarial examples in unconstrained
domains. By doing so, we achieve high misclassification rates in the majority of commonly
used machine learning models applied to the data sets NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15. Our
baseline MC simulation perturbation method generates more or less random perturbations in
the data.
We end this section by mentioning that similar techniques appeared previously in the
adversarial machine learning literature [39]. Hu and Tan [18] propose a GAN-based algorithm
named MalGAN to generate adversarial malware examples which are able to bypass black
box machine learning detection models. Nguyen, Yosinski and Clune [33] use evolutionary
algorithms to generate images that are given high prediction scores by convolutional neural
networks. Drawing ideas from genetic programming, Xu, Qi, and Evans [51] propose a generic
method to evaluate the robustness of classifiers under attack. Their key idea is to stochastically
manipulate a malicious sample to find a variant that preserves the malicious behavior but is
classified as benign by the classifier. More recently, Alzantot et al. [2] introduced GenAttack,
a gradient-free optimization technique that uses genetic algorithms for synthesizing adversarial
examples in the black box setting. Mosli et al. [30] created AdversarialPSO, a black-box attack
that uses fewer queries to create adversarial examples with high success rates. AdversarialPSO
is based on particle swarm optimization, and is flexible in balancing the number of queries
submitted to the target compared to the quality of imperceptible adversarial examples. Finally,
Devine and Bastian [10] used a machine learning approach for robust malware classification
that integrates a MC simulation for adversarial perturbation with meta learning using a stacked
ensemble-based methodology.
4 Methodology
In this section, we give a technical description of the features in the data sets used in our
experiments. We then explain the details of the techniques employed for adversarial example
generation. This leads to the layout of our computational setting.
4.1 Data sets
There are a small number of publicly available, well-known labeled data sets of network traffic
for cyber security research. Two of these data sets are: NSL-KDD [45] and UNSW-NB15 [31].
Both data sets have a mix of benign and malicious traffic with a variety of network traffic
types and attack types. Both data sets have quality limitations due to factors like generation
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methods, prevalence of attack traffic, and size. Nevertheless, these data sets are commonly
used to evaluate machine learning based NIDS.
In general, the data sets contain fields with raw and processed data derived from the under-
lying network traffic. Normally, this data is engineered in research work to detect intrusions
in a network. In many works [14, 15, 11], effort is made to alter the data to create adversarial
examples that can fool detection systems and classifiers. In domains such as image and speech
recognition, perturbing the data to fool the systems can be done in a manner that does not
affect the functionality or appearance of the original item. For example, changing pixel values
in an image by a few bits can be undetectable to the human eye yet fool a trained machine
learning classifier. In network security applications, which is an unconstrained domain, care
must be taken when generating adversarial examples that alter the source data. There are
data, such as the duration of a network packet flow, that if altered will not impact the func-
tionality of the protocol. However, there are fields that if changed can cause the functionality
of the transmission to fail, such as changing the protocol type from TCP to UDP.
The goal of an attacker (who may use adversarial examples) is to alter packets to achieve
a desired effect while still maintaining the functionality of the traffic. Previous research [14,
15] acknowledge that certain fields in the data sets are immutable while others are open to
perturbations. In this work, we subscribe to this position and place technical constraints on
data fields that are mutable. For the data sets used, the mutable fields are described below.
4.1.1 NSL-KDD Data Set
This data set is an altered version of the KDD99 data set with over 125,000 training samples
and more than 22,000 test samples. As described in [19], it contains 41 features based upon raw
network traffic elements, flow traffic elements, and content. The data contains attacks from
four attack types that were more prevalent at the time of the set’s creation (Denial of Service,
Probes, Remote-to-local, and User-to-Root). Attack traffic comprises a little over 50 percent
of the data in the set and the normal data in the set is not representative of modern traffic.
Engineering the features using common techniques such as one-hot encoding and Min-Max
Scaling results in a final data set with 121 features. Of these features, some are immutable
such as protocol-type, service, and flag. A change to these values would cause the underlying
traffic to become non-functional. The remaining features are mutable, though we limit the
perturbations to changes that increase the initial values. The rationale behind such decision
is that these fields, such as src bytes, can increase without altering the functionality of the
traffic (e.g. null packets can be inserted). Decreasing these fields without expert knowledge
of the traffic content would not be certifiably feasible. Other constraints on perturbations to
the data are fields that are binary (the value can only be flipped from 0 to 1 and vice versa)
and fields that are linearly related such as same srv rate and diff srv rate must sum to 1.
A change to one of these fields alters the content of the other. Our analysis of the engineered
features results in 93 immutable features and 29 mutable ones.
4.1.2 UNSW-NB15 Data Set
The UNSW-NB15 data set was generated at the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre
for Cyber Security. It contains over 175,000 training samples and 82,000+ test samples that
are labeled as benign or malicious (including attack type). The data contains nine types of
more modern, low footprint attacks as described in [31]. The benign traffic is more reflective
of current network traffic as well. In this set, attacks compromise a much smaller percentage
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of the data at under 25 percent of the total. This data set was also purposely constructed to
more closely match the content of the training set and test set as highlighted in [32]. The data
has entries with 49 fields of which some are generated by network flow analyzers and intrusion
detection tools. Engineering these fields results in 196 features of which we identified 23 as
mutable. Similar to the NSL-KDD data set, some fields are constrained as binary, increasing
in value only, or have a linear relationship. However, some fields in this set can have decreasing
values such as sttl (e.g. the time to live can arbitrarily be set by the sender), and sload (e.g.
the source can increase/decrease packet sizes and transmission rates).
4.2 Adversarial Example Generation
Adversarial examples have been extensively used to evade machine learning systems. The
methods of generation for these adversarial examples include mostly heuristic techniques [15,
40, 52] and GANs [12, 25, 18]. In this work, we introduce two novel techniques for adversarial
example generation that use evolutionary computation, PSO and GA, along with a GAN that
uniquely considers constrained feature sets to avoid the failure of the resulting traffic. Finally,
we implement a MC simulation generator for baseline comparison.
4.2.1 Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms are commonly used to find near-optimal solutions to NP-hard problems
[48]. In the NIDS setting, searching the space with over 90 dimensions for a solution that
best fools a machine learning classifier can benefit from this type of search heuristic. Figure 1
illustrates a simplistic view of how a genetic algorithm works in general.
Genetic algorithms typically operate on data structures known as chromosomes; a chro-
mosome is a representation of the problems data. For this work, a chromosome is comprised
of a data feature from the source data sets. The GA operates on each row entry in the data
set creating a population of chromosomes. This initial population contains a seed chromo-
some based on the original rows values and randomly generated chromosomes based upon the
seed. Each chromosome contains both mutable and immutable elements. As a result, prior
to performing the algorithms standard operations (cross-over and mutation), the chromosome
is separated into two parts, the fixed and operable elements as shown in Figure 1a. Of note,
each chromosome in the population has a common, fixed element. Once the chromosomes
are sub-divided, the heuristic operations can be performed on the operable sub-part of the
chromosome.
Based upon the chosen cross-over rate, the cross-over operation is performed. Two parent
chromosomes are randomly selected from the population and a cross-over index is selected
randomly. This index separates the operable chromosome into left and right portions in each
parent. The right portions are then swapped between parents to form two new operable
chromosomes. These child chromosomes are then inserted into the population. The cross-over
operation is illustrated in Figure 1b.
The mutation operation perturbs values of randomly selected cells based on a chosen mu-
tation rate. The operation first randomly selects chromosomes to operate upon based on the
mutation rate. Then, a mutation index is randomly selected. Using this index, the targeted
chromosome is modified as shown in the example of Figure 1c. The resulting chromosome is
left in the population in its modified form.
Upon completion of the cross-over and mutation operators, the chromosomes fitness func-
tions are evaluated. In this domain, the fitness metric is the output probability that the
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(a) Initial Chromosome transfor-
mation into operable (mutable)
and fixed (immutable) parts. Cells
marked with an F are immutable
and those with an M are mutable.
(b) Example cross-over operation
on two parent operable chromo-
somes and the resulting child op-
erable chromosomes.
(c) Example mutation operation
performed on an operable chromo-
some.
Figure 1: Genetic Algorithm Operators.
chromosome is classified as benign by a machine learning classifier. To evaluate the chro-
mosome, the operable chromosome must be recombined with the immutable part to form a
valid chromosome. The best chromosome for each generation is maintained in subsequent
generations. The chromosomes in the next generation, limited by the chosen population size
variable, are selected using a roulette wheel technique. The process of selection, cross-over,
and mutation is repeated until a chosen number of iterations is reached or the improvement in
the best fitness is below a chosen threshold. A pseudo-code for the GA is shown in Algorithm
1.
4.2.2 Particle Swarm Optimization
Particle swarm optimization is a bio-inspired heuristic based on behaviors of animals that flock
or swarm [8]. The idea is that each member or particle of the swarm explores the search space
with a calculated velocity. The velocity is updated based upon the particles best solution
and the swarms optimal solution. The probability that the velocity is influenced by the best
solutions is determined by selected weighting coefficients. We used the PySwarms code base
[20] to develop the heuristic used in our work. Figure 2a illustrates how the PSO algorithm
works.
The heuristic begins with the creation of the swarm. The swarm is seeded with a row
from the evaluated data set. The remaining particles are then randomly created using the
seed particle as a baseline. Each particle is then randomly assigned an initial velocity. Similar
to the GA, the particle is composed of mutable and immutable cells. An example particle is
shown in Figure 2b.
In each iteration of the PSO algorithm, the particles fitness function is evaluated using the
same metric as the GA. The values of the particles best location and the global best location
are updated as required. Next, the distances between each particles location and the particles
best location and the global best location is determined. These values are then used to update
the particles velocity and location. The heuristic is repeated until either a selected number of
iterations is reached or the global best fitness improvement is below a chosen threshold. Upon
completion, the global best fitness location is the desired output. The PSO pseudo-code is
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Algorithm 1 Genetic Algorithm
1: Choose cross-over rate, mutation rate, number of chromosomes, maximum iterations
2: Separate seed vector into immutable and mutable sub-vectors
3: Generate initial population of mutable vectors
4: Mutable seed vector created as a chromosome
5: Randomly generate remaining chromosomes
6: Determine population best fitness using fixed portion of seed vector
7: while (iterations < maximum iterations) and (improvement > improvement minimum) do
8: for number of cross-over operations do
9: Randomly select two parent chromosomes
10: Randomly select cross-over index
11: Perform cross-over at the index
12: Add two offspring chromosomes to the population
13: for each chromosome in the population do
14: if random number <= mutation rate then
15: Randomly select mutation index
16: Update chromosome at mutation index with new value
17: Calculate fitness of each chromosome
18: Update population best fitness
19: Select next generation using roulette wheel method
(a) Example Particle Swarm with particles moving in the
search space.
(b) Example Particle after creation of the par-
ticle swarm.
Figure 2: Particle Swarm Optimization Scheme.
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shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Particle Swarm Optimization
1: Choose initial weights, number of particles, maximum iterations
2: Initialize swarm
3: Seed vector created as particle
4: Randomly generate remaining particles
5: Randomly generate initial velocities
6: while (iterations < maximum iterations) and (improvement > improvement minimum) do
7: Calculate each particles fitness
8: Update global best fitness and each particles best fitness
9: for each particle do
10: Calculate distance between location and particle best fitness
11: Calculate distance between location and global best fitness
12: Update particle velocity
13: Update particle location
14: Output global best fitness location
4.2.3 Generative Adversarial Network
Generative adversarial networks are a deep learning technique that pits two neural networks
against each other in a game setting. The GAN is composed of a generator and a discriminator.
The generators task is to learn about the discriminator and thus train to deceive it. The
discriminator attempts to discern if its inputs are from the genuine data set or from the
adversarial data set. As described in the original work [12], the competition between the two
components continues until neither can improve their abilities. In our scenario, it is desired
that the generator, once trained, can modify malicious input vectors such that the output
is classified as benign by the target classifier. The pseudo-code of the GAN is depicted in
Algorithm 3.
Because of the constrained data set, the data input to the generator is divided into mutable
and immutable parts like the GA and PSO. Noise is then added to the mutable portion of
the data by randomly selecting features and perturbing their values. One contribution that
we make in this heuristic is the addition of non-binary features in the GANs operations and
the consideration of constrained data sets. Other work in this area either does not consider
constrained data sets or only use binary features in their operation thus limiting their applica-
tion. Additionally, due to the nature of this domain, there is no need to search for a minimum
perturbation in the data. Unlike the image domain, large changes in the data are not subject
to easy recognition by human observers.
This noisy vector, containing the noisy mutable and original fixed portions, is then fed
to the generator neural network whose output is a vector of the same size as the mutable
portion of the original input. This adversarial vector output is then combined with the initial
immutable portion of the input vector to form a new adversarial input, which is then fed to
the discriminator to generate labels (benign or malicious). These labels are used to improve
the neural networks predictions. To accomplish our goal, the generator and discriminator are
alternately trained using batches of training data. A depiction of the generators training is
shown in Figure 3.
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Algorithm 3 Generative Adversarial Network
1: for number of iterations do
2: for number of generator training steps do
3: Randomly select rows from benign and malicious traffic vectors
4: Break malicious vector into mutable and immutable sub-vector
5: Add noise randomly to malicious mutable sub-vector
6: Combine malicious noisy mutable and original immutable sub-vectors
7: Input to generator neural network
8: Combine mutable output of generator with original immutable sub-vector
9: Input to discriminator to predict labels
10: If prediction is benign, feedback label = mutable output of generator
11: If prediction is malicious, feedback label = benign traffic vector
12: Train generator using resulting feedback labels
13: for number of discriminator training steps do
14: Randomly select rows from benign traffic vectors
15: Input benign traffic and generator noisy traffic to discriminator and voting classifier to
predict labels
16: If discriminator label = voting classifier label, feedback = malicious
17: Else, feedback = benign
18: Train discriminator using resulting feedback labels
19: Input test vectors to generator to create adversarial vectors
20: Test adversarial vectors using voting classifier
Figure 3: GAN generator training operations. M’ represents perturbed inputs and M* represents
generator modified values.
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Figure 4: GAN discriminator training. M’ represents perturbed inputs and M* represents generator
modified values.
The discriminator is trained using the complete adversarial vectors from the generator along
with benign vectors from the data set. These vectors are then classified by the discriminator
and a separate machine learning classifier as benign or malicious. The outputs of the two
classifiers are compared in the following way. If both classify an input as malicious, then the
feedback to the discriminator is labelled malicious. Otherwise, the classification is benign. A
depiction of the discriminator training method is shown in Figure 4.
4.2.4 Monte Carlo Simulation
To create a baseline comparison for the evolutionary computation (GA and PSO) and deep
learning (GAN) adversarial example generation techniques, we implemented a MC simulation
that randomly perturbs features. The heuristic operates by first randomly selecting the features
to perturb from the list of mutable ones. Then, these features are increased in the range [xi, 1].
Note that we abide by the same limitations on how the values are modified as in the other
three methods. This process is repeated for a fixed number of iterations and the best fitness
score is recorded.
4.3 Computational Experiment
The perturbation methods based on evolutionary computation, deep learning, and MC simu-
lation were run on both data sets: NSL-KDD [45] and UNSW-NB15 [31]. Only the vectors
labeled as malicious were used in the evaluation of the methods because the ultimate goal is
deceiving the classifiers with modified malicious inputs. The NSL-KDD testing set contains
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12, 828 malicious vectors while the UNSW-NB15 test set contains 45, 328 malicious vectors.
The Scikit-learn package [36] is used for the development of our code with the exception of the
GAN which utilizes Keras models for the neural networks. A baseline classification is developed
on the unmodified test set using classifiers similar to those described in the work of [19]. The
fitness function used for GA and PSO is a Voting Ensemble Classifier formed by soft voting and
the following sub-models: Support Vector Machine (SVM), Decision Tree (DT), Naive Bayes
(NB), and K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN). The SVM settings are: gamma = 0.01, C = 220.0,
tol = 0.01, probability = True. The Naive Bayes model has the default settings, while the
Decision Tree algorithm uses the settings: criterion = “entropy”, min samples split = 4,
min samples leaf = 2, max depth = 20, min impurity decrease = 0.1. Finally, the KNN
algorithm settings are: n neighbors = 3, algorithm = “auto”.
The parameters of the GA are a population size of 100 chromosomes, 1000 generations
maximum, a cross-over rate of 0.25, a mutation rate of 0.2, and an early termination criterion
of less than 0.01% improvement in 5 generations. The parameters used in the PSO heuristic
are 200 particles, c1 = 0.5 (coefficient for particle local best solution), c2 = 0.4 (coefficient for
swarm global best solution), w = 0.7 (weight for last velocity), a maximum of 100 iterations,
and an early termination criterion of less than 0.001% improvement. The MC simulation is
run with a maximum of 15 perturbed features per vector and a total of 250 iterations per
vector. The optimal settings on all the algorithms are determined experimentally.
The GAN generator is created using a Keras Sequential model with a dense input layer of
size 122 for the NSL-KDD data set and 196 for the UNSW-NB15 data set. The generator has
five additional dense layers of size 29 for the NSL-KDD data set and 23 for the UNSW-NB15
data set, and uses a relu activation function for all layers. The model employs a stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) optimizer with an lr of 0.01, a clipvalue of 0.01 with a loss function of
mean squared error. The GAN discriminator is a three-layer dense model with similar input
sizes to the generator but with a single output. The initial two layers use a relu activation
function while the output layer uses a sigmoid activation function. The model uses a RMSprop
optimizer with an lr of 0.01, a clipvalue of 0.01, and a binary crossentropy loss function. The
models are trained for 300 iterations of 10 steps each and vector batch size of 50.
Each of the methods produces a set of perturbed malicious vectors. These vectors are
then input into 11 separate classification models to evaluate their performance. Four of the
evaluation classifiers are the sub-models used in the GA/PSO voting ensemble. The remain-
ing seven are: Random Forest (RF), Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP), Gradient Boosting (GB),
Logistic Regression (LR), Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), Quadratic Discriminant Anal-
ysis (QDA), and Bagging (BAG). The models are chosen to cover a broad range of classifier
categories.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 General Results
The differences in the two data sets used in this work do not allow for comparison between
them in terms of commonalities. The attack types used in the sets only overlap in denial-of-
service and probing attacks and the techniques in the attacks differ greatly due to the fifteen
plus years between their creation. Additionally, the weakness of the NSL-KDD data set with
respect to the composition of its training and test sets creates classification differences that
are likely less prevalent in the UNSW-NB15 data set. Finally, the features of the two data sets
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Table 1: NSL-KDD Data Set. Evasion Rate of Malicious Vectors (% Classified Normal)
ML Model Original Vectors PSO GA GAN MC
SVM 35.78 94.37 99.95 85.85 46.41
DT 46.89 91.75 92.37 92.60 91.13
NB 40.87 83.00 88.27 48.06 80.39
KNN 34.54 54.59 68.19 48.34 69.32
RF 37.81 34.01 46.41 85.90 45.53
MLP 26.95 44.43 77.87 86.18 38.87
GB 32.03 1.02 6.46 66.01 33.49
LR 37.57 14.19 24.46 33.94 36.63
LDA 39.66 99.99 97.18 55.19 96.19
QDA 44.21 56.26 67.78 66.74 61.86
BAG 28.78 54.81 56.15 61.61 41.64
Average 36.83 57.13 65.92 66.40 58.31
only overlap in five collected fields. Therefore, the features used to identify malicious traffic are
mostly incomparable. The discussion of the results by data set below indicates where useful
similarities are found between them.
It should also be noted that no attempt is made to tune the classifiers for the sake of
optimizing their performance under any metric. The classifiers are created to form a basis of
comparison across a wide range of classifier types and the salient feature is the similarity of
the models in their construction.
5.2 Results from the NSL-KDD Data Set
Before analyzing the effectiveness of the perturbation methods for adversarial example gener-
ation, the 11 machine learning models are first evaluated for performance (accuracy) using the
full NSL-KDD data set. The MLP performed the best with an accuracy of 83.27% with the
BAG (80.20%) and LDA (79.68%) models serving second and third best, respectively.
Recall that the PSO, GA, GAN and MC perturbation methods are used to generate ad-
versarial malicious vectors to emulate an evasion attack against the NIDS. To compare the
effectiveness of these four adversarial generation techniques, Table 1 shows the evasion rate
of malicious vectors in terms of percentage of attack traffic classified as normal using the 11
classification models and compared against the unmodified, original vectors.
Compared to the baseline Monte Carlo perturbation technique, the PSO, GA and GAN
performed strictly better for the SVM, DT, MLP, and BAG machine learning models. For
the other classification models, there were varying results across the four perturbation meth-
ods. When comparing these adversarial generation techniques against the original vectors,
the NIDS evasion rate was strictly better for all classifiers except for RF, GB, and LR. This
also holds true for the average evasion rate across all classifiers for each adversarial example
generation algorithm. The ensemble method classifiers were more resilient on average to ad-
versarial attacks though the GAN had more success against them than the other methods.
The evolutionary computation methods (PSO and GA) performed strictly better than the
deep learning method (GAN) for the SVM, NB, KNN, and LDA classifiers, whereas the GAN
performed better than both PSO and GA for the DT, RF, MLP, GB, LR and BAG classifiers.
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Figure 5: Adversarial Example Generation Algorithm Performance Against NSL-KDD Data Set
Table 2: NSL-KDD Data Set. Best Evasion Rate (%) by Adversarial Generation Method
MC PSO GA GAN
96.19 99.99 99.95 92.60
The former’s performance can be attributed partially to the use of most of those models in the
evaluation function for the heuristics. The GAN’s superior performance against the remaining
classifiers is partially attributed to the learning of its discriminator using the voting classifier
and the generator. Additionally, this suggests that when the classifier under-the-hood of the
NIDS uses a tree-based classification model (DT, RF, GB and BAG), then the GAN-based
perturbation method is capable of achieving high misclassification rates.
Upon examination of Figure 5, it is evident that the DT classifier has the least variability
across the four perturbation methods, with an evasion rate above 90%, which is more than
double the performance of the original vectors. This holds true for the UNSW-NB15 data set
as well. In this experiment, the DT classifier was extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples
in general. It is also evident that for QDA and BAG classifiers, the four perturbation methods
had limited performance in terms of evasion rate when compared to the original vectors. For
the LR classifier, all four perturbation methods performed strictly worse than the unmodified
vectors; the results were somewhat mixed for the GB classifier. The best evasion rates by
adversarial generation method are depicted in Table 2.
5.3 Results from the UNSW-NB15 Data Set
For the UNSW-NB15 data set, Table 3 highlights the comparative analysis of the four pertur-
bation methods for adversarial generation against the 11 machine learning models representing
the NIDS classifier. Again, the performance is represented by the evasion rate of malicious vec-
tors in terms of percentage classified as normal using the classifiers and compared against the
original vectors. On average, the GA performed strictly better than the PSO, GAN and MC
techniques and greatly fooled the NIDS compared to the original vectors (73.71% compared
to 5.00% accuracy).
Compared to the MC technique as the baseline perturbation method, PSO, GA and GAN
performed strictly better for the NB machine learning models, and the results were greatly
mixed for the other classifiers representing the NIDS. When comparing the four adversarial
generation techniques against the original vectors, the NIDS evasion rate was strictly better for
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Table 3: UNSW-NB15 Data Set. Evasion Rate of Malicious Vectors (% Classified Normal)
ML Model Original Vectors PSO GA GAN MC
SVM 0.37 96.85 98.88 22.04 77.67
DT 0.14 96.85 100.00 95.43 99.53
NB 33.06 83.66 75.56 32.98 32.90
KNN 3.82 23.56 65.34 4.19 10.64
RF 0.64 9.55 31.28 30.61 46.04
MLP 0.63 11.74 39.36 53.90 55.10
GB 0.55 98.06 99.74 99.42 99.39
LR 2.51 86.96 91.25 71.54 88.77
LDA 0.21 85.68 84.89 7.21 55.09
QDA 10.18 4.77 24.82 31.37 30.42
BAG 2.91 97.83 99.65 99.61 99.30
Average 5.00 63.23 73.71 49.85 63.17
Table 4: UNSW-NB15 Data Set. Best Evasion Rate (%) by Adversarial Generation Method
MC PSO GA GAN
99.53 98.06 100.00 99.61
all classifiers except NB and QDA suggesting that modern traffic features are more susceptible
to adversarial manipulation than the older traffic. The evolutionary computation methods
(PSO and GA) performed strictly better than the deep learning method (GAN) for the SVM,
DT, NB, KNN, LR, and LDA classifiers, whereas the GAN performed strictly better than
both PSO and GA for the MLP and QDA. This seems to suggest that when the classifier
under-the-hood of the NIDS uses a neural network based classification model (MLP), then the
GAN-based perturbation method can more easily fool the NIDS; although, the MC technique
did an overall better job of evading for this machine learning model.
Upon examination of Figure 6, it is evident that the BAG, DT and GB classifiers had the
least variability across the four perturbation methods, with an evasion rate above 95%. This
suggests that each of the adversarial example generation techniques are nearly equally good
at fooling NIDS that use tree-based classifiers; this also suggests that these types of machine
learning models are easily fooled. This is similar to the RF classifier, which is also tree-based,
but the overall performance is much less for the four perturbation methods. For the NB
classifier, the GAN and MC performed strictly worse than the unmodified vectors, which was
not the case for the evolutionary computation methods (PSO and GA) that performed strictly
better (over double). The best evasion rates by adversarial generation method are depicted in
Table 4.
6 Conclusion
It is widely believed nowadays that no domain is immune to adversarial machine learning.
With the purpose of validating the hypothesis that constrained domains are at least as vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks as unconstrained ones, this paper investigated the effects of
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Figure 6: Adversarial Example Generation Algorithm Performance Against UNSW-NB15 Data Set
creating perturbations using techniques from evolutionary computation (PSO and GA) and
deep learning (GAN). The main goal of our computational experimentation was to tweak ma-
licious traffic in order to evade detection by NIDS, i.e. to “trick” the ML systems to classify
such traffic as normal.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to incorporate evolutionary algorithms in
the realm of adversarial machine learning in the network intrusion detection setting. Through-
out our results, it was evident that the data vectors created via the PSO, GA, and GAN
methods achieved high misclassification rates against a handful of machine learning classifiers.
We highlight some key takeaways below.
First, the support vector machine (SVM) and the decision tree (DT) classifiers were the
most vulnerable against adversarial examples created by evolutionary algorithms and genera-
tive adversarial networks (> 90% evasion rate). This leads us to recommend refraining from
using them in NIDS and in mission-critical tasks in general. Second, in the network traffic
data, it is not quite realistic to assume that a potential adversary has the capability to alter
each and every feature of the traffic. This is a crucial assumption that distinguishes between
crafting adversarial examples in unconstrained domains versus ones in constrained domains.
In our work, we rely on subject matter expertise to filter the features that can be modified by
an attacker without breaking the functionality of the network traffic. It is worth mentioning
that our strategy differs from that adopted in [40], where the choice of modifiable features
does not seem to preserve the network functionality. Third, our results show that the same set
of adversarial examples that managed to fool one machine learning classifier also succeeded at
fooling several others. A particular instance of such observation was the performance of the
adversarial examples generated by the PSO algorithm in the UNSW-NB15 data set (98.06%
against GB, 85.68% against LDA, and 97.83% against BAG). This observation can be consid-
ered as additional evidence to the transferability phenomenon first alluded to in [34] within
the image recognition setting and in [40] within the network intrusion detection setting.
In the future, we aim to analyze the internal operations of the ML models used in this
paper. It is clear that all of them are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, but it not clear
why some of them are more robust than the others in the NIDS setting. We hope that a
systematic study of their mechanism would shed some light on their robustness and explain
their sensitivity to small input alterations.
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